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Limits On Congress' Regulation Of The States - Constitutional Law I

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Limits on Congress' Regulation of the States

  1. Generally Applicable laws as Applied to the States

    1. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

    2. National League of Cities v. Usery (pg. 650) - OVERRULED BY Garcia

      1. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court struck down a federal statute that extended the minimum wage and maximum hour regulations to almost all state and municipal employees.

        • The Court held that "insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3." National League of Cities v. Usery (pg. 652) (emphasis added)

    1. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (pg. 653)

      1. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court overruled National League of Cities, and upheld the federal minimum wage laws.

        • The Court stated that "[w]e . . . now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'" Garcia (pg. 654)

      2. In setting the new rule, the Court stated that it was "convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result." Garcia (pg. 654)

        • Therefore, the Court stated the rule that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action - the built-in restraints that our system might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Garcia (pg. 655)

      3. Garcia stands for the proposition that States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulatable state activity; therefore, the tenth amendment does not provide any protection in the courts for states with respect to generally applicable laws as applied to the states.

    2. In South Carolina v. Baker, the Court applied the Garcia rule to uphold the constitutionality of Section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which eliminated the exemption from federal income tax of interest earned on nonregistered bonds issued by states and local municipalities. (pg. 664)

      1. The Court found the tenth amendment claim foreclosed by Garcia, which the Court described as holding that the limits of Congress's authority to regulate state activities "are structural - not substantive" (i.e., that States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulatable state activity.

      2. "Where . . . the national political process did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated." South Carolina v. Baker (pg. 664)

    3. Gregory v. Ashcroft (pg. 665)

      1. This case simply stands for the proposition that where Congress decides to legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States, it must do so clearly and unequivocally.

        • "If Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.'" Gregory v. Ashcroft (pg. 667)

          • "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise." Gregory v. Ashcroft (pg. 668)

      1. In Gregory, the Court held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not preempt the Missouri Constitutional provision requiring judges to retire at the age of seventy years old because the ADEA was ambiguous and it was unclear whether state judges fell within one of the exceptions to the Act. Therefore, since Congress did not make it "unmistakably clear" that it intended to regulate the conduct at issue, the Court did not strike down the State constitutional provision.

  2. "Anti-Commandeering" Doctrine

    1. New York v. United States (pg. 674)

      1. "The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." New York v. United States (pp. 684-85)

        • "Congress may not simply 'commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'" New York v. United States (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.) (pg. 677)

        • "'[T]his Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations.'" New York v. United States (quoting FERC v. Mississippi) (pg. 677)

        • "[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instruction." New York v. United States (pg. 677)

        • "[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished." New York v. United States (pg. 679)

        • One reason that the federal government may not command the states to regulate is that "where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications if their decision." New York v. United States (pg. 679)

      2. "That is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, or that Congress may not hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a States's policy choices." New York v. United States (pg. 678)

        • "First, under Congress' spending power, 'Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.'" New York v. United States (quoting South Dakota v. Dole) (pg. 678)

          • "Such conditions must (among other requirements) bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending . . . ." New York v. United States (pg. 678)

          • "Where the recipient of federal funds is a State, as is not unusual today, the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a State's legislative choices. . . ." New York v. United States (pg. 679)

        • "Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation." New York v. United States (pg. 679)

          • "This arrangement . . . has been termed 'a program of cooperative federalism' . . . ." New York v. United States (pg. 679)

      3. "The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves of the encroachment." New York v. United States (pg. 682)

      4. "State officials . . . cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution." New York v. United States (pg. 683)

      5. In New York, the Court evaluated three types of incentives that were provided for in the Low-Level Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985: (1) monetary incentives, (2) access incentives, and (3) the take title provision.

        • (1) With respect to the monetary incentives, the Court concluded that this was a proper exercise of the spending power. "Congress has placed conditions - the achievement of the...

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