#15079 - Civil Rights Litigation Major - Civil Rights Litigation

Civil Rights Litigation, Fall 2016

Professor Michael Collins, UVA Law

Cause of Action/Rights Violation

I. “Ordinary” versus “Constitutional” Torts

• Constitutional Hooks: Due process, excessive force, private violence, takings, taxes (non-exhaustive)

  • Due Process:

    • Official negligence is not sufficient to support 1983, even without post-deprivation proceedings (Daniels, Davidson: cannot argue state system is constitutionally inadequate for failure to remedy negligence). Official recklessness may be.

    • Parratt territory: If DPC claim stems from a random and unauthorized departure from required state pre-deprivation proceedings, must proceed to post-deprivation proceedings before filing 1983. Parratt. (see Zinermon category 3B, Parratt exception to Monroe)

    • Monroe territory: For all other DP claims (including BoR/incorporation, SDP), like other constitutional violations, may file 1983 without regard to state post-deprivation process. Zinermon (see categories 1, 2, 3A) – Monroe principle

  • Excessive Force: determine seized/non-seized/detained, stage of criminal process, then look to outline/chart to determine standard (4A, 5A/14A, 8A)

    • Monroe: straight to court under 1983

  • Private Violence: No DPC claim for mere deprivation of reputation (Paul), failure to protect from a violent private party (DeShaney), failure to enforce a restraining order against a violent private party (Castle Rock), but see Collins comment on prisons/recklessness

  • Takings are not complete/ripe (i.e., can’t sue under 1983 or other relevant CoA) until:

    • A) Both (1) the taking and (2) the decision on compensation are final (Williamson)
      OR

    • B) Futility: Pursuing state remedies or appeals on either (1) or (2) would be futile because there is state precedent on point that would render it unsuccessful
      OR

    • C) Removal: State/Defendant removes state proceedings on (1) or (2) to federal court (Chicago)

    • Preclusion: State court decisions on the constitutionality of the taking and the justness of the compensation are issue preclusive in a later 1983 suit. San Remo

  • Tax Injunction Act – Federal courts prohibited from enjoining, suspending, or sustaining state taxes where there is a “plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” to be had in state courts

• Due Process, Official Deprivations, and State Tort Law

  • Due Process

    • Parratt v. Taylor (1981 p. 180) Random & Unauthorized Deprivations: Ripeness

      • FACTS: state prison lost prisoner’s package. State remedies would be available, but sued under 1983 for DP

      • Required Process: negligent deprivation of property is covered by DPC (overruled by Daniels, negligence is not a violation), and can sustain a 1983 claim, however, where the negligence results from a random and unauthorized deviation from established procedures, no pre-deprivation process is required and post-deprivation process suffices.

      • Ripeness: there is no DP violation unless there are problems with post-deprivation process. At that point, Monroe kicks in and no need for exhaustion of state remedies.

      • Hudson v. Palmer (1984 p. 187): extends Parratt to random and unauthorized intentional deprivations of property – (1) no need for pre-deprivation process even if intentional and (2) violation cannot occur until post-post-deprivation process

    • Daniels v. Williams (1986 p. 188):

      • FACTS: prisoner slips & falls on pillow, says guards negligently left it there. State law prevented recovery. Filed 1983 action for DP violation (state system is constitutionally inadequate to remedy negligence)

      • Negligence by government does not constitute a DPC violation (overruled part of Parratt) – constitution doesn’t require pre- or post-deprivation process for simple negligence

    • Davidson v. Cannon (1986 p. 189)

      • FACTS: 1 prisoner beat another; guards allegedly negligent in not stepping in

      • RULE: official negligence is not a violation of procedural due process (must be willful). So constitution requires no compensation mechanism.

  • Zinermon v. Burch (1990 p. 192) DP Violation Categories:

    • (1) BoR Rights (as incorporated by 14A): Follow Monroe; state law remedies are irrelevant. Parratt does not apply.

    • (2) Substantive Due Process: Follow Monroe; state law remedies are irrelevant. Parratt does not apply.

      • DPC Rights that “can’t find a comfortable textual home”

    • (3) Due Process Clause “Simpliciter” (Procedural Due Process)

      • (A) Deprivations resulting from absence of, or insufficiency of, or policy/custom of lack of adherence to constitutionally required pre-deprivation proceeding. Follow Monroe and go to 1983. Parratt does not apply. See Ingraham.

      • (B) (cellar) Deprivations resulting a random and unauthorized departure from constitutionally sufficient state proceedings. Follow Parratt & progeny. No DP violation unless problem with state post-deprivation proceedings.

  • Ingraham v. Wright (1977 p. 194) - Pre- vs. Post-Deprivation DP

    • FACTS: kid punished at school by paddle with no pre-paddle hearing, parents not notified

    • Pre-Deprivation Hearing: 1983 can sustain actions claims of insufficient pre-deprivation hearing under DPC, but not all deprivations require pre-deprivation hearing, so you may lose on the merits

    • Post-Deprivation Hearing: where DPC merely requires post-deprivation hearings, must first exhaust state remedies before 1983 claim can be sustained

    • APPLICATION: no DPC right to pre-deprivation hearing here, so no more 1983 claim

• Private Violence and the Constitution

  • Cf. Prisoner cases

  • Paul v. Davis (1976 p. 194) No DPC Interest in Reputation

    • FACTS: D puts P’s name on flyer identifying him as a shoplifter. P sues, DP violation of liberty through destruction of reputation.

    • RULE: DPC does not protect interest in reputation.

  • DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS (1989 p. 197) No Right to Protection

    • FACTS: father beats child into coma, mother sues county for not protecting the child

    • Non-Private Actor Rule: the DPC (even SDP) does not give you the right to protection from violence by private actors

    • Constitutional Minimum: equal protection clause simply requires that police not discriminate in protecting citizens, but no requirement that they obtain results

    • COLLINS: may be DPC claim if driving drunk, cops took keys, left by side of road, mugged; also DPC protection in prison or other involuntary custody situations (these must be more than negligent – Daniels, Davidson)

  • Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005 p. 200) No Right to Enforcement of Order

    • FACTS: Mother told cops to enforce protective order against father more strictly. Police ignore, father kills kids and himself. Mother argues violation of her DPC interest in enforcement of the order.

    • RULE: No DPC property interest in degree of enforcement of protective orders.

• Searches under 4A

  • 4A Standard: objectively reasonable under the circumstances

    • Collins: there’s two layers of reasonableness when you have to ask about qualified immunity (unreasonable Search & Seizure AND unreasonableness in not knowing about constitutional line)

  • Anderson v. Creighton (1987 p. 56) Two Layers of Reasonableness for qualified immunity

    • FACTS: police search P’s home while in pursuit of bank robber and w/o warrant.

    • Collins: there’s two layers of reasonableness when you have to ask about qualified immunity (unreasonable Search & Seizure AND unreasonableness in not knowing about constitutional line)

    • See also Wilson & bringing in media during search (bringing in the media was unreasonable, but cops weren’t unreasonable in not knowing this)

• Excessive Force

  • NOTE: still may have immunities

  • Constitutional Hooks: situations include seized persons, non-seized persons and pre-trial detainees, prison

    • Seized Persons: 4A Search and seizure

      • When: Investigation and arrest (possibly pretrial detainees as well, Kingsley)

      • Standard: was excessive force was objectively reasonable under the circumstance (same for excessive force as searches)? Graham.

      • Examples:

        • Graham v. Connor (1989 p. 201) Force Standard for 4A Cases

          • FACTS: 4th Amendment excessive force claim

          • RULE: Reasonable under the circumstances is standard for 4A force.

            • Collins: there’s two layers of reasonableness when you have to ask qualified immunity (unreasonable Search & Seizure AND unreasonableness in not knowing about constitutional line) (see Anderson, Wilson)

          • COLLINS: Governs most arrest situations (they are “seizures”).

        • 4A search and seizure when police stop car in chase using force (but see Lewis for injuries sustained without force)

    • Pretrial detainees/involuntary commitments and non-seized persons (i.e., not seized or searched under 4A)

      • 5A (also a deprivation of process claim in Zinermon Category #1):

        • When: Question of whether was used to extract a confession

        • Standard: “malicious and sadistic sufficiently so to shock the conscience” Chavez.

          • Chavez v. Martinez (2003 not in packet): plurality says non-physical coercion/interrogation pre-miranda is not a 5A violation; concurrence says it is but that the proper remedy isn’t damages but rather exclusion of evidence at trial

      • 14A EPC: if used force based on protected class or other discriminatory reason then violates EPC

        • Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (200 p. 215): non force setting

      • Substantive Due Process (14A for states, 5A for feds)

        • When: Free persons not being searched, or detained persons who have not been convicted. (e.g., Lewis)

          • Non-force situations (e.g., health/safety of pretrial detainees): deliberate indifference standard

            • But see Lewis: standard of shocks the conscience when there is no time to deliberate

          • Force situations: shocks the conscience

            • But...