#14177 - Nelson 2015 Federal Courts - Federal Courts

Federal Courts

Fall 2015

##Justiciability

• Advisory Opinions: about Adversity (GW) and Finality/Bindingness (Hayburn’s)

  • GW 1793 Letter (p. 52) - Adversity & Separation of Powers

    • FACTS: sent letter to SCOTUS asking to interpret US treaty relating to getting involved in the GB-France War

    • RESPONSE:

      • (1) This is an extrajudicial function because there is no adversity/dispute and it thus falls outside the A3 judicial power of the US.

      • (2) Propriety separation of powers concerns: would be improper for judiciary to provide president with advice (role of executive)

        • Would weaken judicial independence and make judiciary seem political

        • A2S2: “he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments” (should be limited to executive departments since that’s what it says)

    • COUNTERARGUMENTS: (not our understanding today)

      • Pfander and Burke: Tutun v. U.S. (1926) (p. 86) (Brandeis) held court ruling on uncontested petitions for naturalization satisfy case or controversy requirement. Brandeis did, however, attempt to make the US seem like an adverse party.

      • John Marshall (1800) speech to congress: “A case in law or equity was a term well understood, and of limited signification. It was a controversy between parties which had taken a shape for judicial decision. . . . To come within this description, a question must assume a legal form for forensic litigation and judicial decision. There must be parties to come into court, who can be reached by [the court’s] process, and bound by its power; whose rights admit of ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit.”

        • Case: requires parties and binding decision. If there are no adverse parties then it cannot be disposed of.

          • Civil or criminal

        • Controversy: requires only parties

          • Always civil

  • Hayburn’s Case (1792) (p. 82) - Finality

    • FACTS: Vets from rev war wanted to receive federal pensions if disabled from war. Court would certify to Sec. of War that applicant should receive pension.

    • RULE: SCOTUS issued continuance

      • NY Circuit Court: Under the constitution, executive & legislative branches may only assign judicial duties to the judiciary

      • PA Circuit Court: Legislative oversight of opinions makes these judgments non-judicial, and the courts cannot partake in nonjudicial functions

      • NC Circuit Court: Congress’ power to establish lower courts is bounded only by the Constitution, but it cannot establish a court that will be subject to legislative oversight.

    • UPSHOT: Congress cannot vest review of courts’ decisions in the executive branch. If government wins in court, it can give up its right to enforce the court (see below) order, but if government loses, it can’t vacate the judgment.

    • Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp. (1948) (p. 87): It has also been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.”

  • Distinction from Presidential Pardon and Forfeiting Judgment

    • Presidential Pardon: the ability of the POTUS to pardon following a judgment does not render that judgment an advisory opinion because POTUS is simply relinquishing his ability to enforce the judgment

    • Legislative Forfeiture: a judgment requiring a private party to pay the government money can be forfeited by congress because

      • (1) Congress could repeal the statute that supported the judgment, even retroactively

      • (2) Each party must have a litigable interest that at risk of losing, and the decision would be binding if the other side wins: this does not say anything about what you have to do with the judgment

• Cases and Controversies (within the meaning of A3)

  • Two requires: Adverse parties with (1) litigable interests at stake who (2) are at risk of a binding judgment

    • Note: discussed in reverse order

  • (2) Binding Judgment

    • Finality: established by statute, what makes things binding (e.g. failure to timely appeal makes district court decision final and binding), and once final it is a vested right, and legislature cannot divest a vested right.

    • Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm (1995): (p. 5 photocopied materials) - Congress can only adjust finality prospectively, not retrospectively

      • BACKGROUND: Lampf v. Gilbertson (1999): Decided while Plaut pending; for certain implied COA under Sec. Exch. Act SOL changed from longer state SOL to new court defined uniform federal SOL.

      • FACTS: case filed pre Lampf, so fed courts borrowed state SOLs, post Lampf courts set shorter one. This case was dismissed as time barred by the new courts set SOL. Congress then passed a statute adjusting SOL for cases brought pre-Lampf saying to determine by state law. Asked to get reinstated.

      • ISSUE: Congress’s ability to overturn judicial finality (w/r/t preclusion)

      • RULE: for actions still pending, congressional intervention is OK, but once a final judgment has been issued, Congress cannot force courts to reopen, even by setting a new rule

        • Reasoning 1: Congress cannot perform judicial role to reopen case

        • Reasoning 2: If they could do this, then it would transform all judgments into advisory opinions (not binding), subject to change via retroactive Congressional rulemaking

        • EXCEPTION: if on appeal, law can be changed (if it’s clear the law is retroactive and the time for appeal has not expired)

      • POLICY: no retrospective changes in finality, can be prospective

      • OUTCOME: could not get action reinstated

      • See: implied cause of action

    • Prospective vs. Retrospective Changes: under Plaut distinction (above)

      • Finality of money damages/preclusion can’t be changed because that is retrospective

      • Can change future effect of injunctions because that is prospective

      • NELSON: at most, laws can alter present/future effect of past actions, so any law is prospective. Thus Prospective vs. Retrospective is semantic to some degree (though the court relies on it in e.g. Plaut)

    • Money Damages vs. Injunctive Relief:

      • Miller v. French (2000) (p. 92 item 4)

        • RULE: congress can negate ongoing injunctive relief

        • Reasoning: “The provision of prospective relief is subject to the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the court, and therefore may be altered according to subsequent changes in the law”

      • Why different?

        • Legal Distinction: FRCP 60(b)(5): Allows courts to modify or vacate an injunction if Congress changes the underlying substantive law such that the injunction is no longer equitable

          • Like Plout, finality that a court can pronounce is no more than what the law will permit, and because FRCP 60(b)(5) says that injunctions can be modified or vacated, they cannot be more final than that

          • No such provision for altering money damage awards, so by law they are more final

          • Miller v. French is not quite this, because here the statute congress passed didn’t just create new law, but instead it said that it would explicitly said it would change the ongoing injunctive relief

        • Constitutional Distinction:

          • Could be built into the constitution or historical context, but NELSON thinks this is an incomplete answer and thus supports the broader Vested Private Rights theory

          • Hinges on 19th century distinction between vested rights (e.g. $ damages) and nonvested rights (e.g. injunctive relief)

          • Scalia did not fully endorse the distinction between vested and nonvested rights in Plaut, but this is consistent with it

    • Vested Rights Theory: 19th Century Conception (Edward Corwin)

      • Could once act retroactively w/r/t public rights (if you sued gov’t and gov’t and won, they could allow another private citizen to sue on the same claims)

        • This is like Hayburn’s Case (government can abandon its interest if it wins)

      • Once certain types of private rights have become vested (e.g. through judicial finality), state and federal legislatures are barred from divesting that right (cast either as separation of powers, or due process deprivation of property)

      • Faded in modern law - not as categorical rule

        • Still firm for $ damages, but less form for injunction

  • (1) Adverse Parties

    • US v. Windsor (2013) (p. 100 5(c)) Prudential Limits

      • FACTS: Federal government levied the death tax on a lesbian widow b/c DOMA. Government loses at district court and appeals only because it wants SCOTUS precedent overturning DOMA.

      • RULE: This only implicates “prudential limits” (that an appellate court normally won’t hear when both sides agree) - the constitutionally required “concrete adverseness” is present

      • TAKEAWAY: could moot the case by agreeing and paying back $, but can’t moot the case by agreeing on the law alone

      • Constitutional Adverseness: Adverse interests are required, not adverse arguments.

      • Scalia DISSENT: there is no case because they agree (Nelson/Majority says in practice courts don’t take these cases, but it’s not a constitutional limit)

• Declaratory Judgments

  • Why is this a case/controversy and not an advisory opinion?

    • There are adverse interests, and the decision would be binding (i.e., litigable interest - they would have res judicata effect in future).

    • Aetna v. Haworth (1937, page 57): declaratory judgment appropriate when the exact same interests could be brought or raised in a suit for traditional relief. Did not constitute an AO because the dispute was “concrete” and not hypothetical, and the case would constitute “an adjudication of present right upon established facts.”

  • Policy Points

    • Prevents P from having to wait for actual damage to occur

    • Allows D to initiate the lawsuit

  • History:

    • Pre-1934: could only bring claims...