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#11007 - Strict Liability - Torts

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  • Two writs, trespass (direct) and case (non-direct)

  • (Thorns) liability simply for trespassing but opened up the possibility that if the D had proved that he had done all in his power to keep the thorns off the plaintiff’s land, the result might have been otherwise.

  • Two soldiers engaged in a military exercise, P shot D which made out a prima facie case for trespass. Only defense was proving that P was “utterly without fault.” “Utterly without fault” in this case, would mean that the D ran across P as he was firing.

  • Stone was carried onto Stone’s property by others involuntarily. Party(s) that brought Stone on the land were guilty of trespass not Stone.

  • Negligence = Negligence liability for injurers and SL for injurees of non-negligently causes injuries.

  • Benefits of SL

  • Greater Accuracy

  • Possible if currently D’s are negligent 60% of time but juries only find negligence 10% of the time. Imposing SL is now wrong 40% of the time which is less than the current 50% error rate under negligence.

  • Lower administrative costs

  • No need to prove negligence

  • Activity level effects

  • If liability is imposed no matter HOW the activity is conducted, it will only be conducted when its benefits outweigh its potential costs.

  • Under SL potential injurers must focus not only on how they are doing the activities but there is a greater incentive to shift to safer activities or reduce the activity level.

  • Research incentives

  • Under negligence, injurers are not held liable for injuries not worth avoiding.

  • They may seek to reduce negligence but not eliminate it

  • Loss distribution

  • Strict liability is better at loss distribution if injurers happen to be large corporations.

  • United States is the ultimate risk spreader

  • D had a reservoir constructed on his property which escaped flooding the P’s property.

  • J. Blackburn – escape of anything brought on the land that was not naturally there.

  • Unnatural use of land that causes damages

  • Most significant Modern Factors

  • (Amer. Cyanamid) – Court declined to impose SL on the operator of a rail car that leaked dangerous gas in a residential area. Court found that the operator probably could have prevented the leak through the exercise of reasonable care in the inspection and maintenance of the tank car in question. The court distinguished cases holding transporters of gasoline strictly liable for explosions, on the ground that explosions typically destroy evidence of negligence, whereas leaks do not. Further, the court noted the impossibility of SL’s having an activity level effect in this kind of case because of the difficulty in routing rail-transported material away from the metropolitan areas that serve as railroad hubs.

  • If the P had warned D about the mink’s it could have been foreseeable. Or if the P had known about the mink’s it could have been seen as D’s duty to warn P.

  • The risk is not only more foreseeable to mink owners but the risk is more controllable by them (move the minks during blasting, etc.) With respect to the risk that blasting will frighten nervous animals, mink owners are in a better position than blasters to make the activity-level and research calculations that SL induces.

  • RIL would have to be bent to allow accidents that HAPPEN AT ALL rather than just accidents that only occur because of negligence.

  • Employers are vicariously liable for the actions of their employees if done within the “foreseeable scope” of their employment

  • Bushey sinking ship after opening release valve because of negligence (arguably foreseeable and thus liable) vs. same defendant beating his wife after leaving the ship (not liable)

  • Frolic – extreme departure from employment activities (going to NY in the course of a delivery in town to Cville)

  • Detour – stopping for lunch on the way to a delivery

  • Public vs. Private Necessity

  • Public necessity when there is a risk to the property of a sufficiently large number of people to make the risk “public” and that risk can be reduced or eliminated by damaging or destroying the property of the P. (P’s house is torn down to prevent the spread of a fire that would damage many other people’s houses)

  • Private necessity when there is a risk to one party or his property only and this party can reduce or eliminate that risk by damaging or destroying someone else’s property. In these cases, the privilege is qualified or conditional. Because the condition is qualified rather than absolute, the D is liable to the P for the damage done to the latter’s property.

  • Duty owed when property is damaged during necessitated availment

  • Ploof v. Putnam - P’s sailing in Lake Champlain when a sudden storm forced them to tie up at the D’s dock. D had his servant untie the ship and as a result the boat and its contents were destroyed and the P’s were injured.

  • Court ruled that the P’s were entitled to tie up to the dock because of necessity and that it therefore was not a trespass. Alternatively, untying the boat was a trespass upon the P.

  • Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation – D’s ship had been unloading at the P’s dock when a storm arose. By the time the unloading was completed it would have been dangerous to venture out into the storm so the ship remained moored to the dock. At the mooring lines parted or chafed they were replaced. The P sued for damage that resulted from the buffeting of the ship against the dock during the storm.

  • D argued that because it would have been negligent, perhaps even foolhardy, to untie the ship from the dock, because of the risk to ship and life, it should not be held liable for the damage to the dock.

  • Court disagreed, holding that the D had a conditional privilege only. Although the D had done nothing wrong, it had saved the ship at the expense of the dock and was liable for the damage that result.

  • Neither side is really “at fault”

  • Damages are the liability of the party that made the “choice.” Even though the shipowner was forced to make the choice to stay moored to P’s dock, it was still his choice.

  • Greater efficiency based on the least cost avoider?

  • Which party can avoid risk most cheaply?

  • Dock owner installing bumpers could be easier and cheaper than options available to shipowners.

  • SL on ship owners causes ships to be a little less valuable and docks a little more and vice versa.

  • Ronald Coase, Coasian theory of contracting around necessity in a world with no transaction costs.

  • Any substantial nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of liability-=forming conduct is a private nuisance.

  • Abstract sense of being offended that certain activities are being conducted in one’s own neighborhood. On set of certain activities will invite noise, confusion, and public mischief (halfway house, bars, x-rated theater).

  • What counts as substantial interference depends on all the circumstances, including the nature of the neighborhood or area in which the P and D occupy or use their properties.

  • When nuisance is not intentional a negligence standard is used.

  • (Michalson v....

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