#12244 - Judgment Costs And Appeal - Civil Procedure

STAGE NINE: JUDGMENT, COSTS, & APPEAL

1. Judgment – FRCP 54, 65(d)

   1. Synthesized Rule/Procedure

      1. Prevailing Π/Δs are entitled to all relief necessary, including injunctions, even if not pleaded.

   2. Textual Rule

      1. Relief: all final judgments besides default judgments should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings. FRCP 54(c).

      2. Injunctive Relief: must state reasons why it was issued and in specific terms and reasonable detail the acts restrained or required. FRCP 65(d)(1).

         1. Parties Bound: the parties, their officers/employees, and persons in active concert. FRCP 65(d)(2).

   3. Analysis

      1. Relief

         1. May be compensatory damages, nominal damages, punitive damages, or an injunction.

            1. Compensatory damages require an actual injury, not just a civil rights violation. Carey.

               1. May be based on a per diem assessment by jury, Foradori v. Harris (5th Cir. 2008), or even a statistical analysis based on past awards, Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp. (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

            2. Nominal damages are awarded if there is no actual injury, but rights were violated. Carey.

            3. Punitive damages are awarded, even under § 1983, when party was motivated by an evil intent or reckless indifference to rights. Smith v. Wade (U.S. 1983).

               1. Excessive damages may violate the Due Process Clause. BMW v. Gore (U.S. 1996).

            4. Injunctions are governed by FRCP 65. They are awarded when Π succeeds on the merits, there is no remedy at law, Π risks irreparable harm, the hardship posed by the injunction doesn’t weigh against it, the injunction will serve the public interest, and the court can administer it. Injunctions are enforced by FRCP 4.1.

         2. It is possible to collect damages when the only thing claimed in the complaint is an injunction, as relief is not limited to the complaint. S.M.U. Ass’n.

      2. The “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine: federal courts should not reach merits of a state court decision about state law. This does not apply to administrative courts. Van Harken.

   4. Cases

      1. Carey v. Piphus (U.S. 1978, 64): Πs were suspended without procedural due process. However, there was no injury resulting from the lack of procedural due process. As there was no injury, Πs are entitled to nominal damages only: $1.

2. Declaratory Judgment – 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202; FRCP 57

   1. Synthesized Rule/Procedure

   2. Textual Rule

      1. Remedy: the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a declaratory judgment. FRCP 57.

   3. Analysis

      1. Remedy

         1. Reasons for wanting a declaratory judgment include:

            1. setting up future remedies;

            2. gives leverage during settlement;

            3. can establish precedent;

            4. provides information; and

            5. can resolve uncertainty, especially when a title is in dispute.

   4. Cases

      1. Carey v. Piphus (U.S. 1978, 64): Πs won declaratory judgment that their rights were violated, but since they were not injured, they were only entitled to nominal damages.

3. Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law – FRCP 50(b)

   1. Synthesized Rule/Procedure

      1. This is the same as a motion for summary judgment or JMOL, but after trial—no later than 28 days.

   2. Textual Rule

      1. Procedure: within 28 days after trial, Δ* may renew the motion. Court may allow judgment on the verdict, order a new trial, or direct the verdict. FRCP 50(c).

   3. Analysis

      1. Compared to JMOL

         1. Tactically, a judge may want a jury to hear and decide an issue before dismissing it, because during trial judges are I guess afraid of taking things away from jurors.

      2. Limited Judgment

         1. The judgment, like summary judgment, may just be for a particular issue or claim, not the entire case.

4. Costs of Suit – 28 U.S.C. § 1920; FRCP 54(d), 68

   1. Synthesized Rule/Procedure

      1. The court has the discretion to award Π/Δ should costs from other party on 14 days notice.

      2. Poor Π may not have to pay costs if suit regards a “fundamental right.”

   2. Textual Rule

      1. Costs: include fees of clerk and marshal, printing, disbursements, translators, etc. 28 U.S.C. §1920.

      2. Procedure: costs other than attorneys’ fees should be allowed to the prevailing party, unless a federal statues, FRCP, or a court order provides otherwise. FRCP 54(d)(1).

         1. The United States: if U.S. is losing party, costs may be imposed only to extent allowed by law. FRCP (d)(1)

      3. Offer of Judgment: if losing party made an offer of judgment greater than what prevailing party received, prevailing party owes post-offer costs. FRCP 68.

   3. Analysis

      1. Costs

         1. These may be very high, e.g. $50k. Depasquale v. IBM (E.D. Pa. 1998).

            1. Loser is obligated to pay them even if he is unemployed and winner is large corporation. Cherry v. Champion Int’l Corp. (4th Cir. 1999).

         2. Filing fees may be waived if Π is poor and suit regards a “fundamental right,”

            1. e.g.: divorce, Boddie v. Conn. (U.S. 1971), or parental rights, M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (U.S. 1996);

            2. not: bankruptcy, United States v. Kras (U.S. 1973), or welfare reduction, Ortwein v. Schwab (U.S. 1973).

         3. Courts also may not include attorneys’ fees as costs unless Congress authorizes it by statute. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society (U.S. 1975).

5. Attorney’s Fees – 42 USC §1988; FRCP 54(d)(2), 68

   1. Synthesized Rule/Procedure

      1. Π/Δ may move for award of attorney’s fees, if authorized, within 14 days after entry of judgment.

      2. To earn “reasonable” §1988 fee, Π must receive remedy that is greater than any FRCP 68 offer of judgment.

      3. Regarding other statutory fee awards, definition of “prevailing” party and FRCP 68’s application may be different.

   2. Textual Rule

      1. Procedure: Π may move for fees within 14 days after entry of judgment. FRCP 54(2)(b).

      2. 42 U.S.C. §1988: when Π wins a §1983 civil rights case, court should assess a “reasonable fee” against Δ for Π’s attorneys. 42 U.S.C. §1988.

         1. FRCP 68: Π is not entitled to attorney’s fees if Π declined a more valuable offer of judgment. FRCP 68.

      3. Other Statutes: the Civil Rights Act of 1991, among others, authorizes fee awards for declaratory judgments.

      4. Frivolous Suits: if Π initiates a frivolous lawsuit, Π may be responsible for attorney’s fees. 28 U.S.C. §1927.

      5. ABA: fees should not be unreasonable, but should depend on time, precluding employment, local rates, results, time limits, the nature of relationship, lawyer experience, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent. ABA Rule 1.5.

         1. Contingent Fees: generally 30%, but are not allowed for domestic relations (e.g. divorce) or criminal defense suits.

         2. Non-refundable Retainers: ethics are questionable, but they are allowed.

   3. Analysis

      1. §1988 Suits

         1. “Reasonable fee” awards do not replace private contracts for contingency fees, which Πs must always pay. Venegas.

            1. They can also be negotiated away in settlement. Evans.

         2. “Reasonable” is determined by the “lodestar” contingency method: hours expended times lawyers’ reasonable hourly rate, contingent on the Π prevailing. Venegas.

            1. This is true even if lodestar is greater than 40% contingency, Blanchard v. Bergeron (U.S. 1989), e.g. when $245 lodestar award dwarfed $33k civil rights damages, Riverside v. Rivera (U.S. 1986).

            2. “Reasonable” used to be “market rate,” that depended upon the type of case, e.g. contingency fee for expected damages. This was not necessarily the same as what Π negotiated with her attorney, for reasons of fairness to Δ. Kirchoff.

         3. Attorney’s fees are typically awarded when Π receives a remedy.

            1. Nominal damages do not normally entitle Π to attorney’s fees. Farrar v. Hobby (U.S. 1992).

            2. Fees have, however, been awarded when counsel had a difficult time overcoming antipathy toward a prisoner by showing he had constitutional rights. Lucas v. Guyton (D. S.C. 1995).

            3. Δ must pay fees regardless of whether its defenses were groundless. Newman v. Piggie Park Entertainment Inc. (U.S. 1978).

         4. Δ may receive §1988 fees only if Π’s suit was frivolous. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (U.S. 1978).

            1. In other statutes, e.g. 17 U.S.C. §505, Δs may receive fees as a matter of course. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. (U.S. 1994).

      2. Other Statutes

         1. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically authorizes fee-shifting for nominal relief. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications (10th Cir. 1998).

      3. FRCP 68

         1. If a FRCP 68 offer of judgment was greater than Π’s final judgment, Δ does not owe Π’s attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988. This is not true for all other statutes. See, supra, at Offer of Judgment.

      4. Frivolous Lawsuits

         1. Frivolous Πs may be held responsible for all costs, including Δ’s attorney’s fees. 28 U.S.C. §1927.

      5. ABA

         1. The ABA rule is that attorneys may take no unreasonable fees, yet attorneys often commit fraud, very few are caught, a hired firm is very valuable, and ratting out an attorney who commits fraud is dangerous because of retaliation.

      6. Contingent Fees

         1. $465/hr may be unreasonable, Zucker, but courts have been considerably more lenient. Brobeck.

      7. Non-refundable Retainers

         1. The...