Federal Protection Against Unlawful State Action - Federal Courts Author-1

IX. Federal Protection Against Unlawful State Action

§1983 Actions Alleging Violations of Due Process Clause

SUMMARY. There are three types of claims cognizable under the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause: (1) incorporated rights claims; (2) substantive due process claims; and (3) procedural due process claims. Violations of incorporated rights or substantive due process are actionable under §1983 when the wrongful action is taken, regardless whether there is any state tort remedy that might provide compensation (Zinermon). A §1983 action cannot be brought for a violation of procedural due process unless the State has failed to provide adequate process (Zinermon).

If the officer’s action resulting in deprivation was unpredictable and unauthorized, pre-deprivation is not possible and post-deprivation process can remedy the constitutional violation (Parrat; Hudson v. Palmer). However, if the deprivation was the result of an officer’s predictable exercise of delegated authority, a constitutional violation, actionable under §1983, has occurred when the wrongful action is taken (Zinermon).

POLICY BACKGROUND. The Court seems to be motivated by a desire to avoid turning the Due Process Clause into a “font of tort law.” There is a plausible argument that every common law tort by a public official is a violation of the Due Process Clause (every common law tort will involve deprivation of life, liberty, or property). But the Court is resisting this, motivated in part by concerns of judicial federalism.

PRACTICALLY UNOBTAINABLE REMEDY. The fact that post-deprivation remedy is practically unobtainable as the result of qualified immunity or other state law doctrine is not sufficient reason to recognize a §1983 action (Hudson v. Palmer). Thus, in Davidson v. Cannon, the Court concluded that a statute immunizing all public officials from liability premised on one prisoner’s injury of another prisoner did not render the state’s post-deprivation procedure constitutionally inadequate so as to permit an action under §1983.

NEGLIGENT DEPRIVATIONS? Daniels v. Williams held that merely negligent acts cannot constitute a deprivation within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.

Is There “State Action” Where An Officer Takes Action That Is Illegal Under State Law?

HOME TELEPHONE. Actions taken by a state officer in his official capacity constitute “state action” for purposes of the 14th Amendment, even if they violate state law (Home Telephone).

FRANKFURTER’S VIEW. Justice Frankfurter disagreed with Home Telephone: Action taken in defiance of state law “cannot be deemed the action of the State … until the highest court of the State confirms such action and thereby makes it the law of the State” (Snowden concurrence). Frankfurter also argued that §1983 should only come into play where relief is unavailable in state court due to a custom of non-enforcement. The rationale for this approach is that state law should be perfectly capable of dealing with individual bad apples.

42 U.S.C. §1983

§1983 provides that “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity¹, or other proper proceeding for redress ….”

28 U.S.C. §1343(a) provides that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights . . . of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”

“UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW.” An action is taken “under color state law” for §1983 purposes, even if it is illegal under state law, if it is only “made possible because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law” (Monroe v. Pape).

EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES NOT REQUIRED. All actions taken “under color of state law” are actionable under §1983 (Monroe v. Pape) regardless whether there is a remedy under state law.

MUNICIPALITIES. Municipalities are among the “persons” rendered liable by §1983 (Monell) when their “policy” or “custom” violates the Constitution or other federal law. Municipalities cannot be rendered liable on a respondeat superior theory (Monell). Unlike officers sued in their individual capacity, municipalities cannot be liable for punitive damages.

Policy Or Custom. State law determines who is a policymaking official (Praprotnik). A single decision of a high official like a county prosecutor, whose decision may fairly be said to represent official policy, may be an adequate basis for imposing governmental liability under §1983 (Pembaur). A decisionmaker who has delegated authority, but whose decisions are formally subject to review by a superior official, is not a policymaking official (Prapotnik).

Municipal Liability For Failure To Train. A municipal training policy that directly causes constitutional violations can be the basis for §1983 liability even if the policy itself is not unconstitutional (City of Canton). However, municipal liability for failure to train is permitted only where “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights (City of Canton). The “deliberate indifference” must relate to “the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff” (County Comm’rs v. Brown). To demonstrate “deliberate indifference,” a plaintiff must demonstrate a pattern of officer violations that are similar to the one complained of (Connick).²

Qualified Immunity. Municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity (Owen v. City of Independence).

STATES. Quern held that Congress did not clearly manifest an intention in §1983 to override the states’ 11th Amendment immunity. Thus, neither a state nor a state...