State Courts In The Constitutional Scheme - Federal Courts Author-1

• IV. State Courts in the Constitutional Scheme

  What Jurisdiction May the State Courts Exercise?

  PRESUMPTION OF CONCURRENCY. In Federalist, No. 82, Hamilton indicated that state courts would presumptively have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, absent explicit action to make federal jurisdiction explicit. The Court has accepted Hamilton’s view of Article III. In Tafflin v. Levitt, for example, the Court held that the presumption of concurrency could only be overcome “by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.” In concurrence, Justice Scalia emphasized that it takes “an affirmative act of power under the Supremacy Clause to oust the States of jurisdiction,” so the question is never whether Congress intended to authorize state court jurisdiction but whether Congress intended to preempt it.

  In Yellow Freight System, the Court appeared to move towards a clear-statement rule, recognizing that “the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction … lies at the core of our federal system” and indicating that “the omission of any [express rejection of concurrency] is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress” did not intend to reject concurrency.

  “UNAVOIDABLY EXCLUSIVE” FEDERAL JURISDICTION? Justice Story believed that Article III made federal jurisdiction “unavoidably exclusive” in at least some classes of cases, including federal criminal cases, other cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and cases within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction (Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee). See also Collins (arguing that the first Congress assumed that Congress did not need to create inferior federal courts, but that it must do so if it intended to create certain federal claims). Tafflin and other Supreme Court decisions have decisively rejected this view, but Tarble’s Case is arguably consistent with it—that Congress cannot provide for a standing army capable of detaining individuals without providing a forum for federal habeas relief.

  CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY. The first Congress provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal crimes, federal seizures, and civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, among other causes. Pockets of exclusive federal jurisdiction have existed ever since. Congress’s authority to preempt state jurisdiction, in areas where Congress has authority to create a cause of action at all, is unquestioned. For example, Justice Field stated that “in all cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends, Congress may rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal courts.”

  Tennessee v. Davis held that Congress had the authority to provide for the removal of a state criminal prosecution to federal court where the defendant could assert a federal defense.

Policy. When would it make sense for Congress to provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction, rather than concurrent jurisdiction with a right of defendants to remove to federal court? Clearly, exclusive federal jurisdiction can only be warranted if there is a structural reason—not related to the interests of the particular parties at issue—to prefer federal jurisdiction. For example, might there be a structural interest in uniform application and development of the patent law that would justify overriding the preferences of individual litigants in some cases?

THE HABEAS EXCEPTION: TARBLE’S CASE. Tarble’s Case held that the constitutional structure of federalism strips state courts of the power to remedy unlawful federal detention by habeas corpus. Federal courts are entrusted by the constitution to provide the exclusive remedy in these cases. Tarble’s Case supports ongoing assumptions that state courts cannot issue habeas, mandamus, and possibly even injunctions against federal officers.

Tarble’s Case is departs from the general presumption of concurrency. It is also impossible to square with the following assumptions: (1) that the Constitution does not require inferior federal courts (per the Madisonian Compromise), and (2) that there must be some court able to grant habeas relief against federal officers. If these assumptions are correct, Tarble’s Case must be wrong as a constitutional matter (it might be construed as resting on implicit congressional intent in statutes providing for the standing army).

The second premise might be rejected by relying on Ex Parte Bollman’s statement that if Congress did not authorize federal courts to issue the writ against federal officers, “the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.” But this statement should probably be read as providing that the existence of the writ would remain in the control of the states, and that the writ could be lost, notwithstanding Congress’s failure to suspend it, by independent action of the states. Moreover, Bollman no longer states good law, to the extent that Boumediene held that the Suspension Clause provides jurisdiction for federal habeas where Congress has not provided it (“The Clause affirm[s] the … authority … of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”).

Because Boumediene holds that the Suspension Clause requires the existence of federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions against the Executive (except in cases of suspension), it must be understood (1) as overrunning Ex Parte Bollman’s conclusion that the Court can only exercise original habeas jurisdiction where there has been an inferior federal proceeding or (2) that inferior federal courts are constitutionally required. Either way, Boumediene clarifies the paradox created by Tarble’s Case (which held that state courts could not grant habeas relief against federal custodians). After Boumediene, although state habeas jurisdiction over federal officers is constitutionally prohibited, federal habeas jurisdiction over federal officers is constitutionally required.

• Obligation of State Courts to Enforce Federal Law

State courts “may not discriminate against rights arising under federal law” (Mondou). Federal law may be enforced, as of right, in state courts of general jurisdiction (Mondou), but state courts may decline jurisdiction over federal law claims if there is a valid excuse. An excuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse (Howlett). However, “when a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral rule regarding the administration of the courts,” federal courts “must act with the utmost caution before deciding that [they are] obligated to entertain the claim.” Examples of neutral rules related to the administration of the courts that may constitute valid excuses include rules of FNC (Douglas), municipal jurisdiction, or statute of limitations (Herb).

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. State courts are not obligated to entertain suits against the state if the state has not chosen to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, even if the state has waived immunity to comparable state law claims (Alden v. Maine).

PROCEDURAL RULES IN STATE COURT ADJUDICATION OF FEDERAL CLAIMS. The general rule is that state courts, when adjudicating federal rights, apply their normal procedures. Only a few cases depart from this principle. However, the Court has indicated that “federal law takes state courts as it finds them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal law” (Felder), suggesting that there is room to challenge state procedures if they are unnecessarily burdensome.

Federal Employee’s Liability Act. Dice held that state court hearing claims under FELA were required to provide jury trials, because “the right to trial by jury … was part and parcel of the remedy” afforded by the act. By contrast, Bombolis—distinguished in Dice—held that a state could apply its general non-unanimous jury rule to FELA claims. Dissenting in Dice, Frankfurter, J., affirmed Testa’s holding that “no State which gives its courts jurisdiction over common law actions may deny access to its courts for a negligence action” founded on FELA, but argued that “a State is under no duty to treat actions arising under the Act differently from the way it adjudicates local actions for negligence so far as the mechanics of litigation” are concerned.

Central Vermont held that a state rule requiring the plaintiff to prove freedom from contributory negligence did not apply in a FELA action. Brown v. Western Ry. held that “strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal law.” Dissenting, Frankfurter, J., argued that a litigant who chooses to enforce a federal right in state court should not be heard to object to the application of the state’s normal procedures.

SECTION 1983. Substance. State courts are obligated to entertain §1983 actions where they have waived their sovereign immunity in comparable actions under state law (Howlett v. Rose). However, “ensuring equality of treatment of state and federal causes of action is the beginning, not the end, of the Supremacy Clause analysis” (Haywood), and state courts of general jurisdiction must exercise jurisdiction over §1983 prisoner suits even if they are forbidden to exercise jurisdiction over state law prisoner suits.

Procedures. States may not require administrative exhaustion before exercising jurisdiction on these claims (Felder), because Patsy held that exhaustion is not required for these claims. A state...