Cause-In-Fact
The “But for Test”
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The But-For Test: If not for D’s negligence, is it more probably than not that the harm would have occurred? (Third Restatement)
In order to get to the jury, the court must determine whether P has met his burden of production that in supplying enough evidence that a reasonable juror could infer that if not for P’s negligence, the harm could not have occurred
In the case of Grimstad, could D’s wife, if there was a buoy on board, grabbed it, thrown it to him, and saved him?
New York Central RR v. Grimstad (p.378)
P sued for failure to equip the barge with proper life preservers when her husband fell into the water and drowned
Causation question is: If there were life preservers on board, would Grimstad have been saved from drowning?
Court ruled that there is nothing to show that the defendant did not drown from another cause (i.e. did not know how to swim) or that life preservers would have saved him, or that the wife could have gotten the life preserver and thrown it to him.
Reversed and grants motion to dismiss
There is no reason why Grimstad should not have gone to the jury. Key question if whether the wife could have gotten the buoy and thrown it to him. Should be a question for the jury.
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel
Plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions when a father and son drowned in a pool. Applicable statute provided that “lifeguard service shall be provided or signs shall be erected clearly indicating that such service is not provided”. Defendant neither provided the lifeguard service nor posted the signs, and no evidence explained how the deaths actually took place.
Court held that the plaintiffs had gone “as far as they possibly could under the circumstances in proving the requisite causal link between defendant’s negligence and the accidents” and although the main purpose of a lifeguard is to prevent accidents, it is also to witness accidents. Accordingly, the burden of proof on causation should be shifted to the defendants.
Is this a res ipsa case?
Self-Proving Causation
Reynolds v. Texas: If a particular cause of negligence greatly increases the chance of harm, and the harm occurs, that is enough to get to the jury
Self-Proving Causation invoked in circumstances where:
The negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chance of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence
Defendant does that act, and that particular accident happens
Of course, defendant can always exonerate himself by proving something else caused the accident.
A kind of negligence that increases the risks of lots of things does not fall under self-proving causation.
We are looking for a king of negligence that increases the likelihood of a particular kind of harm.
Reynolds v. Texas (p.380, lighted stairways): Plaintiff, a 250lb woman, after hurrying out of a lighted waiting room, fell down the unlighted steps leading to the train platform.
Court held that where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiples the chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect.
Recurring Miss: If we do not let these plaintiffs get to the jury, defendants will never have an incentive to light stairs, etc.
Zuchowicz v. United States (p.382) (apply reasoning with CAUTION): Plaintiff developed a fatal lung condition as a result of defendant’s negligence in prescribing a severe overdose of a drug
Question of causation is whether the negligence (the overdose) caused the illness.
Court allows self-proving causation: that is, if the overdose significantly increases the odds of hypertension and hypertension happens, we assume the overdose is a but for cause and it is up to the defendant to disprove that.
Court is recognizing that direct evidence is not always possible
Court holds overdose caused the injury
Joint and Several Liability: Multiple Sufficient Causes
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Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry (p.402)
Two fires came from two different directions and combined to burn plaintiff’s house
Either fire would have alone burned the house
One fire was started by defendant, the source of the second fire was unknown
Rules in fire cases:
2 negligent fires: Each defendant is individually responsible for the entire damage (joint and several liability)
Both defendants in town/have money: they likely split it 50/50. If one is judgment proof, the other pays the entire thing
J & S liability rule applies to joint tort feasors, concurrent tort feasors, and if either of defendant’s acts individually would have caused the same damage
Negligent fire and a natural fire: defendant is off the hook. Defendant’s fire is not a “but for cause” of the damage
Since the court did not know how the second fire started, and since the burden of this lost info determines who wins the case, the court rules in favor of the plaintiff
Smith v. JC Penny Co.
Plaintiff was wearing a coat purchased from JC Penny made of flammable material supplied by defendant Bunker Ramo. Coat was set ablaze by a fire started through the negligence of another defendant’s service station employees.
Court had model of which to divide liability. An employee of the station had gasoline sprayed on his trousers and was in the same fire as the plaintiff, suffering only minor burns to his legs. Thus the jury could infer that the plaintiff would not have incurred severe burns to her lower extremities if she had not been wearing a coat.
Joint and Several Liability: Indeterminate Causes
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Summers v. Tice (p.407): Plaintiff suffered an injury to his right eye and face as a result of being struck by a bird shot discharged from a shot gun from one of two possible defendants.
Court holds both joint and severally liable, holding “if defendants are independent tort feasors and thus each liable for the damage caused by him alone, and, at least, where the matter of apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent party should not be deprived of his right to redress.”
Kingston does not apply in this case because only one of the hunter’s guns caused the accident, we do not know which ne.
Each defendant was equally negligent in shooting toward the plaintiff. The likelihood that any one defendant shot the plaintiff is 50% (as opposed to if there were 10 people, probability would only be 10%)
Takeways from Summers:
Negligent actions were identical
Defendants were in a better situation to cope with the missing information
Summers, in essence, is liability for mere risk creation
Our alternatives are either P doesn’t get to recover, or we hold both defendants responsible
Court says in a case like this, defendants should bear the burden of the missing information
One defendant is ultimately paying only for risk creation
Market Share Liability
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