#11382 - Duty Scope Of Liability And Proximate Cause - Long Torts Outline

Duty, Scope of Liability, and Proximate Cause

1. Intro to Proximate Cause

2. No single test to determine if D’s actions were the proximate cause of P’s harm as it is usually a policy factor, allowing P’s to recover when it seems right and not when it doesn’t etc.

3. Prox Cause (no intermediate actor):

   1. Is some harm to the particular P forseeable? If no, DV for D (Palgraff)

      1. If yes, go to #2 (Palsgraff)

      2. If harm was emotional, use Zone of Danger or Dillon to identify forseeable P

         1. Dillon:

         2. Plaintiff must be located near scene of the accident

         3. Shock must have resulted from diret emotional impact upon the P from the sensory and contemptuous observance of the accident

         4. Plaintiff and victim must have been closely related

         5. Zone of Danger: Close proximity to the accident, in immediate apprehension of contact

      3. If harm is purely economic, P has to be forseeable in a particularistic kind of way (People’s Airline)- not endorsed by all jurisdictions- Must discuss the policy concerns behind pure economic harm of;

         1. No Fraud

         2. Connecting Ps and Ds through forseeablity

         3. No unlimited liability

   2. Is the extent of harm to the forseeable P forseeable? Does not matter P is liable for full extent of the injuries (Polemis)

   3. Is the type of harm that happened to the forseeable P very different from what made D negligent? Case-by-case exception- if so, not liable (Wagon-Mound)

      1. P will always try and characterize the harm suffered as different extent of harm

      2. D will always try and characterize the harm suffered as different type of harm (not of the same general sort and not from the same forces)

         1. Consider things like directness of harm and whether D is otherwise deterred.

            1. Many of these cases will go to the jury

4. Prox Cause (intermediate actor) [Assuming Above Forseeability Rules are Met]

   1. Restatement: Does not matter whether D2 is intentional, negligent, criminal etc. as long as it is a harm within the risk

      1. If D2 is harm within the risk of D1’s negligenceintervening actor

         1. If not, superseding actor

   2. D1 can get off the hook by “capping their risk” (making it relatively safe) (Price). Therefore, any harm that is done to her after the risk is capped is not a result of D’s negligence increasing the probability of risk to her

   3. Or, D1 can get off the hook if somehow it gets into reasonably safe hands (Horton)

   4. If D violated a statutory duty that was atleast partially aimed at the harmed caused by a potential superseding actor- probably going to be PC (Ross)

6. Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough (p.450)

   1. Plaintiff was traveling on the Borough of Sugar Notch. The ordinance of the borough had a speed limit of eight mph and plaintiff was going faster than that. Plaintiff was driving on the burrough in a violent windstorm, and his car was crushed by a tree that blew down while he was under it. P sued the borough, D asserted P’s speed was the cause of the injury.

      1. P’s speeding was definitely a but for cause of the accident: if he was not going the exact speed he was the tree would have never fallen on him

         1. However, there are risks associated with certain kinds of negligence (risks associated with speeding) and being hit by fallen trees is not one of them

         2. P’s breach of the safety statute was not casually connected with his injuries because the breach did not increase the risk or the hazard of him being struck

            1. If you can prove your negligence is no way associated with the harm, and D is definitely negligent, you get a directed verdict. (P’s want to make a case a Berry case).

            2. Statutes gives us an idea of what risks the particular type of negligence is trying to prevent, we can use it to say P’s negligence did not increase or contribute to the chance of the harm. He is not comparatively negligent.

7. Ryan v. New York Central RR (p.446)

   1. Sparks flew from the defendant’s railroad and lit the defendant’s woodshed on fire, and then it spread to the plaintiff’s hose and other houses.

      1. Ryan Court adopts a bright-ine rule that says that D is responsible to pay for the destruction of the first building [proximate cause] (which just so happens to be his) and is not responsible for how it spreads after that.

         1. Ryan court sort of modifies Berry, by first asking if it was a harm within the risk of D’s negligence; but even if it is, is it too remote?

            1. Third Restatement endorses the Berry outcome

   2. Fork: Ryan court adopted a bright-line rule. Other courts disagree and analyze it on a case-by-case basis.

      1. i.e. Milwaukee & St Paul RR v. Kellogg: The Supreme Court rejected Ryan’s view

      2. Bottom Line: Proximate cause is about policy, there is nothing magic about it, use past cases to predict future cases.

2. Other People’s Negligence as a Harm Within the Risk

   1. When you create a risk by being negligent, you can reasonably forsee other people being negligent (dropping a cig, lighting a spark), and contributing to your risk

   2. All of these cases are about the defendants being jointly and severally liable, but D2 has no money to recover from

   3. D1D2P

      1. Courts are sometimes reluctant to allow recovery from D1 when D2’s act is intentional or criminal. Negligence, in a large measure, is reasonably anticipating other’s actions (won’t be thinking about arson, etc.) [Wagner]

      2. [Brower] Sometimes D is not off the hook if D2 commits a criminal act if it is reasonably forseeable that what D2 does will happen

4. RST § 449 Tortious or Criminal Acts the Probability of Which Makes the Actor’s Conduct Negligent

   1. If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.

5. Intervening Actors Cases

   1. Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (p.459): Defendant was trapped inside a phone booth at a major intersection an was struck by a drunk driver.

      1. Court holds pursuant to RST § 449 PTT the negligent phone booth was the proximate cause.

   2. Hines v. Garrett (p.452): Railroad conductor negligently carried the 19 year old female plaintiff a mile past her stop at night, forcing her to walk back this distance through an area “frequently infested by hobos, tramps, and questionable characters”. On her walk back she was raped twice.

      1. Court says that when the conductor took D past her stop, it was reasonable to foresee she was going to have to walk back home at night and possibly be victimized.

   3. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Price: Through the RR’s negligence, they did not drop her off at her station. She spent the night at a hotel to which she had been escorted by the railroad’s conductor. At the hotel, she was given a room that had a kerosene lamp, which exploded and set fire to the mosquito netting covering the bed and when she tried to put out the fire she burned her hands. She sued the railroad.

      1. Court holds that the railroad capped their risk by putting P in a place (hotel) where she is relatively safe. Then, D2 (hotel) intervened and caused P’s harm. D1 (the railroad) is off the hook.

   4. Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Horton: D discarded a dynamite cap on its unenclosed land next to a school. A ten-year old boy picked it up and played with it at his home, and his mom would pick it up when he was done. He traded it to another thirteen...