Under Marbury v. Madison, SC has the power to review the constitutionality of federal executive actions and federal statutes.
Veto power and appointment of an office are entirely within the president’s discretion and cannot be judicially reviewed.
Where the executive has a specific legal duty to act or refrain from acting, the federal judiciary can provide a remedy, including a writ of mandamus
specific, particular duty(“Safe Product Act” probably not a specific duty)
Issue: Two readings of Judicial Act
Marshall’s reading: SC has OJ in any case where P seeks writ of mandamus
SC has power to issue mandamus in cases otherwise within its Jurisdiction. Under this reading JA would not be unconstitutional
Constitutional Issue 1: Under Marshall’s reading, is JA, which gives OJ to SC to hear this case, consistent with the Constitution?
Art. III § 2 Cl. 2 SC OJ and AJ:
OJ: Trio Cases= Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party
AJ: all other cases
Two reading of Cl. 2
Floor and Ceiling, Marshall’s reading: SC has OJ only over Trio Cases
Floor only: SC has OJ over Trio Cases, can also have OJ over other cases
In all cases… the SC “shall” have OJ | Reading Art. III as a whole | Public policy: Role of SC to interpret Constitution | |
---|---|---|---|
Floor and Ceiling | Marshall’s view: affirmative words are negative of other objects other than those affirmed. | Yes, Marshall’s view: If OJ can be supplemented, not necessary to enumerate OJ. | Yes, prevent SC from having too many unmeaningful cases |
Floor only | Yes, the Constitution not does not say that SC cannot have OJ over other cases. | Art. III specifies that Congress can change SC’s AJ. As for OJ it’s not clear |
Constitutional Issue 2: If not, does the court have the power of judicial review? Argument for judicial review:
Constitutional theory argument
constitution is supreme vis a vis statutes
Written constitution: Power of the legislation is limited and defined by the written constitution. These limits are meaningless unless subject to judicial review.
Counterargument: other countries with written constitution do not grant judiciary the power to invalidate conflicting statutes.
original understanding at the time of the framers
theory of popular sovereignty: people have an original right to establish fundamental principles in the Constitution
Institutional allocation: it’s the judicial duty of SC to interpret the law, to invalidate statutes as unconstitutional (even if Congress thinks otherwise)
Counterarguments:
SC can interpret the law without deciding its constitutionality.
Clear/ unclear violation: those examples (tax, duty, federal bill of attainder) are clear violation of Constitution, but JA’s violation is not as clear.
Arising under jurisdiction of SC: Art III grants SC the JP over all cases arising under the Constitution, this implied JR
Counterargument: SC’s power to decide cases under the Constitution still could have significant content without the power to invalidate federal statutes. E.g. SC can still apply federal statutes, and evaluate the constitutionality of state...