I: Equal Protection: Minimum Basis Review
Question: Classification justified by a permissible purpose.
Tiers of Scrutiny
[also used for fundamental rights] |
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What determines why heighted scrutiny?
3 Traditional Criteria:
Immutable characteristic
Historical Discrimination
Powerless to protect self via political process.
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer (1978)
Not hiring an employee who uses methadone. Safety & efficiency
Fn. 9: Policy is overinclusive, but still has rational relationship.
Stevens Majority: Methadone users not a politically unpopular group
White Dissents: Might need protection from judiciary
Fn. 15: Moreno, Cleburne
II: Equal Protection: Race
Dred Scott (1857)
Birth of 14A in response to this.
Why didn’t Taney stop on the jurisdiction question?
Taney on Judicial Role:
Not to evaluate merits of this opinions
Decision up to law-making political process.
Bifurcation of Justice and Constitutional Interpretation
Dicta: Missouri compromise was beyond
Second federal invalidation of a federal law after Dred Scott.
PROF: What’s wrong with Dred Scott
Should have stopped before Diversity claim?
Abdication of Morality and Justice and Personal responsibility
Scape-goating Taney for being a product of his time?
Frederick Douglas Speech
…
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
Applying effectively rational basis to race
Statute: Separate but equal train cars; but allows nurses of the “other race”
Facially neutral
Separate but equal reasonable for race
Harlan Dissent:
Expressive function of law; can shape social values and inferiority
But still slightly racist: White as dominant and continue to be… Chinaman…
Two theories:
Anti-classification: Colorblind. Harm to race is when any classification is made. Draw no lines on the basis of race
No one believes this in its entirety; can’t send a white cop undercover into a black gang. So, what kind of racial divisions acceptable?
anti-subordination: No superior, dominant race or ruling class. [AA permissible]
Rights:
Civil: File a law suit, make a contract
Political: Right ot vote, run for office
Social: Peer-to-peer; marriage, etc.
Harlan says ride train is a civil right; Majority says it's a social right.
Both agree Social Rights not have to be equal
Originalism:
Three flavors
Framer’s original intent [Meese]
Ratifier’s original understanding
Original public meaning/Original Expected Application
More Modern.
less subjective, more about common usage.
Scalia the most important justice of last generation.
Flexibility in statehouses, not courthouses.
“Living constitution” flexibility is undesirable.
Role of Precedent?
There are sancrosanct opinions. Scalia, “I’m an originalist, not a nut”
Originalism adopted by the Left:
Balkin’s “Living Originalism” – “majestic generalities” not “specificities.”
Founders not always specific, so delegating to future generations.
(See 10/16 lecture for more on Originalism & Liberals)
Takeaway: Originalism can be broad or narrow
DC v. Heller (2008)
Flowering of originalism. Fought exclusively on originalist terms.
Prohibition on handguns in DC unconstitutional.
Scalia: Identify operative clause. Some handgun regulations permissible – certain times, places, people.
PROF: Is Court’s opinion actually a living constitutionalism one?
Stevens dissent: Why is that allowed but not this?
Path to Brown
Cumming (1899): Black taxpayers challenging money for their white high school. Black HS closed.
Harlan: Wrong kind of remedy requested.
[What is the right remedy for EP? Leveling up or down?]
Here, plaintiff asked for leveling down (Close the white HS), should’ve asked to reopen the black school.
Rare to level down (But see swimming pool case)
McCabe v. Atchinson (1914): Sleeper cars on train. Must provide same kinds of facilities if going to be separate.
Emphasis on equal accommodations.
Gaines v. Canada (1938): Can’t have all white law school without a black law school. Paying for a different state’s tuition not sufficient.
Sweatt v. Painter (1950): Law school required to integrate.
Schools in Texas NOT equal.
Intangibles: Faculty, prestige, alumni, standing in community
Can’t match reputation and faculty – inherently unequal.
[Plaintiff chosen carefully: Already married, so no suggestion that he’s looking for a white wife…]
McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950): Public School of education can’t restrict Doctorate student (separate cafeteria table, sit outside the classroom)
Common Law Constitutionalism
David Strauss: How legal change occurs
Court articulates a rule and attempts to apply it, but rule is not satisfactory. Evolves over time, as judges slowly hollow out the rule.
PROF:
Too anemic a conception of what justices are doing.
More aware of what they are doing.
Plessy (rational basis) -> By Buchanan, no longer doing reasonableness.
Not unconscious, but decisive decisions
Buchanan v. Warley (1917)
Residential segregation order impermissible.
Viewed as a break in tradition even immediately after the case.
Property rights issue not explain everything.
How is this not social rights, not civil rights, at play?
Trying to distinguish Plessy
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Common law constitutionalism process of interpretation?
Separate but equal been tried and failed
PROF: This would be precedent-centric. Not true here!
Warren: not an originalist, originalism is inconclusive.
Times have changed since 1896. Public education has exploded.
Modern focus: “Today,” “This day and age”
Holding: Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
But: not address de facto vs. de jure segregation
Brown limited to public education, but Civil Rights Movement expands.
Later per curiam decisions not really justified on Brown.
More Anti-classification than anti-subordination.
“Inferiority never to be undone”
Social science evidence.
But some classification as well: “on the basis of race”
FN. 11: Famous footnote, citing psych studies – were not rigorous science…
Unanimous: but in exchange, Brown II…
PROF: A terrible mistake. Separated right from remedy.
Would South have been less upset if there had been dissents?
[Roe v. Wade was 7-2; would 9-0 have made a difference?]
Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)
companion to Brown
5A, not 14A: 14A not apply to DC.
DP and EP not interchangeable?
“Equal protection component of the 5A”?
See Tribe, “Double helix of liberty and equality” [Windsor?]
PROF: How could originalists reconcile all this?
Brown II (1955): All Deliberate Speed
PROF: A cop-out decision. Brown I a hero, II a villain
Invitation of Southern Manifesto?
More anti-classification than anti-subordination.
See Parents Involved
Cooper v. Aaron (1958) - supra
Loving v. Virginia (1967): Miscegenation laws not ok.
CJ Warren for a unanimous court
(3 years earlier: McLaughlin v. Florida – co-habitation OK)
Strict scrutiny
Note: VA law explicit about white and black
Compared to Brown
EP
Brown: can’t turn back clock to 1896
Loving: Stronger interpretation on 14A. 14A to eliminate all inequality.
DP here also
PROF: Complicate traditional account
Traditional Account: Supreme Court wise to wait in 1955; opposition dwindled since Brown
BUT: Approval of interracial marriage in 1967 very low. Very controversial decision.
Aftermath of Brown: In 6 years between Green and Miliken, court exits the field of policing racial discrimination. 4 new Nixon appointees.
Green (1968): First time weighing in since Cooper
Tail end of Warren Court. Repudiation of Brown II.
“Realistically to work now”
“Not white schools or black schools – just schools”
Does Green include de facto segregation?
Swann (1971)
Court ordered busing affirmed by CJ Burger.
Responding to de facto segregation
Keyes (1973): Denver never had segregation laws but tried to gerrymander school district lines to racially segregate. Brennan for majority.
Powell concur/dissent: should Treat North and South the same. Get rid of de jure/de facto distinction. Prefers Local schools, not busing.
Rehnquist: First Dissent in this line of cases. Keyes and Green go too far. Constitution forbids segregation, not force integration.
Milliken (1974): Detroit suburban schools implicated in court ordered busing.
CJ Burger: Court can’t mandate interdistrict remedies if no interdistrict violations.
Marshall strongly dissents.
* End of the road for meaningful integration
* * *
Discriminatory Impact
Strauder v. West Virginia (1880): Limiting juries to only to white people not OK.
However, limiting to freeholders, citizens, gender education, etc. OK
Later: Gender (Taylor), freeholder (Harper), etc.
How the EP clause changes.
Palmore v. Sidoti (1984): Can’t consider private stigmatization in custody.
(Oregon v. Mitchell: No literacy tests; now Jim Crow-era-education voters can vote)
Washington v. Davis (1976): Police test with racially-disparate effect OK
Rational basis, not strict scrutiny.
White: A lot of neutral policies affect one race more than another