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#11483 - Theories Of Institutional Relationships - Legislation and Statutory Interpretation

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IV.TheoriesofInstitutionalRelationships

1)CorrectingLegislativeMistakes

2)StareDecisisofStatutoryDecisions

3)InterpretingAgencyRegulationsinContextofStatutes

4)EvolutionofStatutes

1)CorrectingLegislativeMistakes

Typesofmistakes

1. UnintentionallycombiningrevisionsofstatutesShinev.Shine

2. Scrivener'serrors

3. Oversight

a. DidnotthinkofconsequencesU.S.v.Locke

b. LackofknowledgeU.S.v.Marshall

Cons:

Absurdityisineyeofbeholder

Federaljudiciaryisanunelectedbody

Ruleagainstsurplusage:donotwantreadingthatissobroadthatitevisceratesany

workdonebywords.

MarshallinLocke

Procedure:Roleofimaginativereconstruction

3. isthereanyrationalbasisforintentionallyinsertingwhatappearstobeanerror?

4. Arethereanyplausiblescenarioswherereasonablestatutecouldhavesomehowledtoan

error?

E.g.StevensinLocke

Thismayalsoinvolveusinglegislativehistory,e.g.Shinev.Shine.

SeePosnerinMarshall

Institutionalcompetence

CongressismoreabletointerpretthanCourts?

AgenciesaremoreabletointerpretthanCongress?

Legislativeprecedent

Ifstatutewaschanged,whatdidstatutepreviouslylooklike?

Cases

U.S.v.Locke

Statute:statuteoflimitationscertainminingrightclaimmustbemadepriortoDecember31.

Issue:IsclaimmadeonDecember31precludedbystatute?

Marshall(majority):ifmeaningisclear,legislativemistakecannotbecorrected,evenwhen

plainmeaningiswhollyillogical,istrapforunwary,andgoesagainstintentionsofdrafter.

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InstitutionalcompetencegapsaretobefilledbyCongress,notbyjudiciary.

Strictreadingmaybeexplainedbysubjectmatter—deadlines—whichareinherently

arbitrary.

Stevens(dissent):thisisobviousscrivener'serror.

Imaginativereconstruction:

Thereisnorationalbasisforthislimitation

thereareanynumberofplausiblescenariosbywhichdraftingerrorcouldhave

arisenoutoforiginallyreasonablestatute

Institutionalcompetenceagenciesarebetterequippedtounderstandingmeaningof

deadline,andagency'spamphletsaysfile"onorbeforeDecember31"

Shinev.Shine(1stCir)

Facts:1972DavidShineandMargueriteShineseparatewithoutseparationagreement.

1973CourtordersDavidShinetopaymonthlymaintenanceMargueriteShine.1975Marguerite

getsdivorcedecree.SuesDavidformaintenance,buthehadalreadygonebankrupt.

Statute:BankruptcyCodeallowsnodischargeofanydebt"toaspouse,formerspouse,orchild ofthedebtor,foralimonyto,maintenancefor,orsupportofsuchspouseorchild,inconnection

withaseparationagreement,divorcedecree,orpropertysettlementagreement…."

"Dischargeable"meansthathusbanddoesnothavetopay,while"nondischargeable"

meansthathusbandstillhastopayevenifhegoesbankrupt.

Absurditycreatedbyplainmeaning:becausemaintenanceorderwasissuedbycourt

beforedivorcedecreewasissued,andthereforewasnotinconnectionwithdivorce decreeorseparationagreement,debtisdischargeable.Thisgoesagainstpurposeof

statutetoprotectdependentfamiliesofbankruptbreadwinners!

Holding:

Legislativehistoryindicatesthatvariousversionsofstatutewereamalgamated@last

minutebutwerenotharmonizedwithoneanothertoproducedesiredprovision. Legislativeprecedentuntil1978wastotreatsuchdebtsasnondischargeable.

ArgumentfrominactionbecauseCongressisdeliberativebody,ifCongresshadwanted

tomakemajorchange,aCongressmemberwouldhavesuggestedit.

Ruger:congressionalinactioncouldbesuggestedbyesotericnatureofprovision

anditsextremelyconcentratedbenefits.

BockLaundry

Stevens:FusionofHouseandSenateversionsofRuleofEvidenceinfinalversionofrule

muddledpurposeofeachone.Wemustlooktointenttorediscoverwhatruleshouldhavebeen.

2)StareDecisisinStatutoryInterpretationDecisions

Staredecisisrequiresacourttotreatpriordecisionsaspresumptivelycorrect.

ApproachestoStareDecisis

SuperStrong

NormalcourtholdsinPattersonv.McLeanUnionthatstatutoryprecedentsaresubject

tonormalstaredecisis.Academicliteratureisinfavorofthisschool.

Soft

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StatutoryLawv.ConstitutionalLaw

1. CourtismoredeferentialtoitsstatutoryinterpretationprecedentsbecauseCongresscanalways

overruletheCourt'spreviousdecision.

2. TheCourtislessdeferentialwithrespecttoconstitutionalprecedent.SincetheCourtisthelast

wordonconstitutionalissues,onlyitcanoverturnaprecedent.

ReasonstoUseStareDecisis(includesLegalProcessTheorists)

Congressionalinaction(seeBrennaninJohnson):ifCongresstrulydisagreedwith

Court'sinterpretationofstatute,itwouldoverturnitvialegislationormembersof

Congresswouldproposebillstodoso.

Restsonassumptionofcongressionalcompetence:Congressisawarethat

statutewillevolveasitislitigated,andthereforehasprerogativetochangestatute

uponCourt'sinterpretation.

NOTE Constitutionalvs.statutory:thisargumentdoesnotworkfor

constitutionalstaredecisis,becauseCourtisultimateinterpreterofConstitution.

ParticularlyconvincingifconditionsoftimewouldfavorchangingCourt's

interpretation(seeBlackmuninFlood):

Floodallothersportsbecamesubjecttoantitrustlaws

CongressionalcompetenceCongressisinbetterpositionthancourtstooverrule

precedents:

Betteraccesstoinformation

MoredemocraticcanbringinvarietyofinterestedpartiestodoCongressional

hearings.

Stability/ruleoflaw(seeStevensinJohnson):

Settlingitatallismoreimportantthansettlingitright

Protectsrelianceinterest

Brightlinerulespromotejudicialeconomy

Keepsdowncostsoflegalservices

Legalprocesstheoristssupportthisidea:lawshouldbepredictable(formalism)+

shouldadapttopresentneeds(realism)butpublicinterestmayinvolverelianceon

traditionalrules.

FailedlegislativeproposalstochangeCourt'sinterpretation

InvalidatesScalia'sunawarenessandpoliticalcowardicearguments

Convincingargumentifbillsaretooextremeoneachside.

Formalism

IndicatesPurpose

Oncecourtdefinespurposeofstatuteinonecase,thatbecomesprecedential

authorityonpurposeofstatute

BabbittusesTVAtogivebroadpurposetoEndangeredSpeciesAct

Acquiescence

ReasonstoSoftenUseofStareDecisis(includesLegalRealists)

Congressionalinaction:congressionalinactionmightnotbemotivatedbyapprovalof

Court'sdecision.Alternativetheoriesforcongressionalinactioneveninfaceof

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disapprovalare:

Disagreementonhowtochangestatusquo

Convincingargumentifcanshowthatdifferentfactionsareinterestedin

changingbillbutcannotcometoagreement

Lessconvincingargument,asinJohnson,ifnooneevenproposesabill

Politicalcowardice

Fearofbeingalienatedbyyourparty lessopportunitytobargainon

futurelegislationthatisimportanttogettingvotes

Indifferencetostatusquo

Convincingargument:

iflegislationhasveryconcentratedbenefitsORcostsbutwhich

wasabletopassasprovisionofmorecomprehensivebillwith

morediffusebenefits

iflegislationaffectsfewpeopleandisthereforeunlikelytobeon

mindsofCongress(Toolsoninre:towhetherFederalBaseball

shouldstand)

Unawarenessofstatusquo

Convincingargumentifissueisnotonnationalstageorisnotwidely

publicized.

LessconvincingargumentifissueiswidelypublicizedorifCongress

takesactionthatseemstoimplyawarenessofstatusquo(e.g.

appropriationsbillinTVA).

BureaucraticlogisticsofCongress:vetogates,committees,etc.

ThereweresomanyobstaclesthatmembersofCongressdidnotbotherto

evenproposebill.

FailedlegislativeproposalstochangeCourt'sinterpretation

Convincingargumentifmultiplebillswereproposedbuttheywereshotdown

becauseof:

Disagreementonoptimalmethod(disagreementonhowtochangestatus

quo)

Proceduralhurdles(bureaucraticlogistics) Onecouldstillarguethattherewasinterest

Powerfullobbies(e.g.baseballowners'lobbyinFlood)

Equitablearguments:Weshouldnotblindlyimitatepastasconditionschange,assenseof

justicechanges,etc.

E.g.DouglasandMarshall'sdissentinFlood.

Practicalarguments:Previousdecisionisblocktoprogressbcit'sunworkable+confusing

E.g.StateOilCo.v.Khanstaredecisishaslessforceinantitrustlawbccourthasinterestin

recognizing+adaptingtochangedcircumstances+lessonsofaccumulatedexperience

Ambiguity:CasesfromSCOTUScangoinbothdirectionsonissue

Cases

Johnsonv.TransportationAgency,SantaClara

Facts:Publicagencyadoptedaffirmativeactionplanandpromotedwoman,only1/110inher

position,overslightlymorequalifiedman.

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Statute:TitleVIIofCivilRightsAct(employmentpractices).

Relevantprecedents:

Weberprivatecompanymayuseaffirmativestepsintrainingprogramtoprivilegeracial

statusindiversifyingworkplacewherethereisstarkimbalance.

Similarity:starkimbalanceinworkplace

Differences:publicvs.private,sexvs.race,plusfactorratherthanquota

SexintroducedintoTitleVIIthroughhostileamendment(hardertomake

anintentionalistargument)

Publicvs.privateWeberwasderegulatorydecision,whereassamelevel

ofderegulationdoesnotapplytopublicemployment.Deregulation promotesbusinessfreedom,avoidslawsuits,andpromotesremedial

justice.

Bakke"quotas"inpubliceducationareunconstitutionalunderEqualProtectionClause

Similarity:public

Differences:sexvs.race,reliedonconstitutionratherthanstatute

Brennan(majority):

SCOTUS'sinterpretationofTitleVIIinWeberwascorrectbecauseCongressnever

changedit congressionalinactionsignalsapprovalofcourt'sinterpretation

Nobillshavebeenpassedtochangestatusquocreatedbycourt

WebersaidthatobjectiveofTitleVIIwasto"breakdownoldpatternsofracial

segregationandhierarchy,"andthiscanbeextendedtoaddressanytraditionally

segregatedimbalance.

Here,therewasstarkimbalanceinworkplace.

DistinguishedfromBakkebecausecompany'saffirmativeactionplandoesnotimpose

quotas.

Scalia(dissent):

CongressionalinactioncouldexisteveninabsenceofapprovaltoCourt'sinterpretation

(see"ReasonstoNotUseStrongStareDecisis")

Adheringtostaredecisiscanbeantidemocraticifitallocatesbenefittoonegroup

repeatedlyovertime.Thisstatutedeprivesbluecollarwhitemales

Ruger:however,thispoliticalgroupwaswellrepresentedinCongress@time.

Publicvs.private:

Therearedistinctreasonstoallowaffirmativeactionamongprivateemployers

thatdonotcarryovertopublicsector.

Stateinstitutionsaresubjectto14thAmendment,sothiscouldbeunconstitutional

under...

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Legislation and Statutory Interpretation