#11484 - Theories Of Legislation - Legislation and Statutory Interpretation

I.TheoriesofLegislation

1)Pluralism/PublicChoiceTheory

Pluralism:Statutesareproductsofcompetingandinteractinginterestgroups,andcertain

groups'interestswillbeshutout.

Interpretiveimplication:Congressshouldengageinpublicspirited

interpretation.Moredeferenceshouldbegiventostatutethathasdiffusebenefits

thanonethathasconcentratedbenefits,andmoredeferenceshouldbegivento

groupwhoseinterestshavebeenshutout.Riskofthisisjudicialactivism.

Specialinterestlegislation

targetedtaxbreaks

industrydrivenlegislation

PublicChoice:politiciansarerationalutilitymaximizerswhotrytomaximizetheirown

interests.Costsofstatutes,andtheirbenefits,mightbeeitherconcentratedordiffuse

Interpretiveimplication:PosnerianL+Etheoryimpliesthatsatuteshouldbe

treatedascontractualnegotiation—eachperson'sinterests+compromisesindeal

oughttoberetainedinstatutoryinterpretation.

Concentratedcosts,diffuse Concentratedcosts,concentrated

benefits"entrepreneurial"politics;CRA benefitsinterestgrouppolitics

sexamendmentwasadvertisedasthis,but itwasreallydiffusecosts+diffusebenefits

Diffusecosts,concentrated Diffusecosts,diffusebenefitsmajoritarian

benefitsspecialinterest/clientlegislation politics

2)Proceduralist/DeliberativeTheory

Thereis"finelywrought"processwherebyCongressenactsstatutes,givingCongress

highlegitimacy

Becauseanypieceofstatutehastopassmanyvetogates,theyshouldbegivenmuch

deference

Medianvotertheoryoflegislativepurpose:whoamongvetogatesis"medianvoter"?

51st%tileinHouse

60thvoteinSenate(filibusters—usedtobe67thvote)

Mediancommitteemember

Committeechair

President

Conferencecommittee

NOTELINKTOSTATUTORYINTERPRETATION—PURPOSIVISM

Interpretiveimplicationsaredivergent:

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Hasbeenusedtosupporttextualism

legitimacyoftext(haswithstoodvetogates)usedtocriticize

congressionalinactionarguments

look@4cornersofdocumenttopreservedealsmade

Hasbeenusedtosupportlegislativeintent

Legislationisseriesofdeals,andaswithparolevidenceincontract,

legislativehistoryisevidenceofdeals

Bestwaytodeterminepurposeistolook@medianvoter(butthenraises

questionofwhoismedianvoter?)

3)PositivePoliticalTheoryandInstitutionalistAccounts

Creationofstatutorymeaningisanongoing,interactiveprocessthatplaysoutovertime

Multipleinstitutions,includingagencies,legislativebranch,executivebranch,judicial

branch,interestgroupsparticipateandinteracttogivemeaning;actorsaresophisticated

andunderstandthisinteractivegame

Congressenactsstatutesunderstandingwhereeachofplayerslieonspectrum,andwill

trytopleasemedianvoter

Interpretiveimplication:Shouldcourtsgivedeferencetootherinterpreters(agencies),or

looktocurrentCongress?

HowaBillBecomesaLaw

1. Draftingofbills(bylegislativestaff,governmentagency,interestgroup,academic)

HOUSE

2. Introductionofbillbymember(appropriationsandrevenuebillstypicallyoriginatein

House)

3. ReferraltoStandingCommittees

4. CommitteeAction(canbeforgonebydischargepetitionbyHouse)

3steps:1)consideration2)markup3)report:a)exactlanguageofbillb)sectionbysection

analysisofbillc)proceduralandsubstantivebackground

5. 6. 7.

Canbereferredtosubcommittee

Hearingsheldonmajorbills

Committeeresolution:takenoaction,defeat,accept,oramendandreport

Votingoutofcommittee

Rulescommittee(majorbills)

Floordebateandamendment(passageordefeat)

SENATE

8. ReferredtoStandingCommittee

9. CommitteeAction

10. Flooraction—notefilibusteroption

CONFERENCECOMMITTEE

IfHouse+Senatepassdifferingversions,conferencecommitteecanbecreatedwith

membersfromeachhouse;eachhousemustagreetoconferencereport

Appealsofcommittees

Specialization+expertise

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Rentseeking:committeememberschoosecommitteesontopicsabouta)whichthey

andtheirconstituentshavestrongpreferencesb)whichtheyhaveselfinterestin

Forcesothercommitteememberstodiligentlymonitoractivitiesofinterested

committeemembers

Toolsofmajorityparty:majoritypartywilldefertointensepreferencesofcommittee

membersinreturnforsupportonissuesvitaltoreelectionofmajority

NonLinearLegislativeProcesses

1)Filibuster Unclearwhetherit'sconstitutional;Rugerthinksnot

Minorityofsenatorsdelaybringingbilltobevotedon,takingadvantageofSenate's

unlimiteddebaterule

2tracksystem:

1)HoldsSenatorcanaskMajorityLeadertoplacetemporary+anonymous

holdonlegislationheadedtowardfloor decreasespoliticalaccountabilityand

itscheapnessmeansit'susedmore,soSenatorsshouldbefairintheiruse

2)ThreatoffilibusterSenatorneedsbackingofpartyinordertoprevent

cloture.IfSenatorthreateningfilibusteris3dparty+nooneagreeswhim,his

filibusterisworthlessbcitcanbeeasilydefeated.

Cloture:votetoendfilibuster+forcevote(SenateRuleXXII)

Initiallyneeded2/3(67Senators);since1975,haveonlyneeded60Senators

(nothingmagicalaboutthisnumber)

SenateRulesneed2/3ofSenatetobechanged

Art.I§5givesHouse+Senateauthorityto"determineRulesofits

Proceedings" filibusterisrulefordebate

Useoffilibusters:

Executivenominations

Ambassadors

FederalofficialsworkinginWhiteHouse

Judicialnominations

Therefore,minoritypartycanblockPresident'snominationsofjudges,

executivepolicymakers,diplomats,etc.

PROS:

givesvoicetominority

forcescompromise

Senatetradition

Enhancesroleofmoderates(buttherearefewermoderatestoday)

CONS:

maybeunconstitutional

evenifnotunconstitutional…

holds,becausetheyareanonymous,amounttoavoidanceof

accountability

morepartisan?

Slowsdownlegislativeaction

Usedasabargainingtool

Antimajoritarian

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Mightnotbeabletobeabletocreatecompromise—1994government

shutdown

Arefilibustersunconstitutional?

YES NO

ruleagainstsurplusageandexpressio listofpermissiblesupermajoritiesmay

uniusthereare7otherplacesinConstitution besuggestiveasopposedtoexclusive

thatrequiresupermajority,sosupermajoritiesare Article5§1allowsSenatetowriteits

confinedtotheseprovisions ownrules

Overrideveto It'sapoliticalquestion,whichis

Proposingconstitutionalamendments judiciallyunreviewable

Convictionbyimpeachment Tradition!Becauseithasbeenaroundforso

Houseimpeaches(actslike long,itwouldbeviolationofproceduraldue

indictment),Senateconvicts processtodoawaywithfilibustersbecauseof

Treaties constitutionality

Expellingmembers Thereareotherantimajoritarianaspects

14thAmendmentrequires2/3ofboth ofSenate:

Housestoallowsomeonewhohas

participatedinaninsurrectionto

PresidentialsuccessionHouseand

Senatemaydetermineby2/3votes

Presidentisincapacitatedandunable

todischargehisduties

allsupermajoritiesinConstitution

Senatorsfromsmallerstatesrepresent

LESSofpublicbuthavejustasmuch

powerinSenate

Committeemembers,powerof

agencies

ArtI,§7PresentmentClause:House+ anySenateruleisanexampleof

Senate+Presidentmust"pass" entrenchment.

Theword"passes"contains

majoritariannorms,and

majoritarianismisdefault

Chafetz:filibusterisunAmerican.

Partysystemenvisions

majoritarianismasthenorm.

entrenchment:becauseSenateis

continuingbody,anyrulesmustbevotedoutby 2/3,anothersupermajority.Senatorswhovotein

filibusterruleentrenchlaterSenates.

Entrenchmentisviolationof1)17thAmendment (directelectionofSenators)2)antientrenchment

principleofArticleIbarringpresentmajority

fromcontrollingactionsofwhatfuturemajority

cando.

history:thereisnounambiguousright

toobstructbyminority

thereareothermajoritarianwaysof

gettingaroundcountermajoritarian"vetogates"

(e.g.dischargepetitions)

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2)Lineitemveto Unconstitutional!

Clintonv.CityofNewYork(nonideologicalvotingbyJustices,1998)

FACTS:AfterPresidentClintonlineitemvetoedfollowing2provisions,beneficiariesof

provisionssuedtochallengeconstitutionality:

BudgetAct1997Medicaidisjointfederalstateprogram(feds5080%,statesrest).

FederalgovtfoundNYSwasshortonitsend,butallowedNYtonotpay$2billion.

PreferentialtreatmenttoNY.

TaxpayerReliefAct1997taxbreak sugarbeet refinery

Verytargetedbenefit100orfewer

PORKBARRELSPENDING!

STATUTE:LineItemVetoActgivesPresidentabilityto"cancel"inwhole3typesofbills:

Newexpenditures

Discretionaryallocations

Taxexpenditures/taxbreaks

Presidentmustcancelwithin5days

Congresshas45daysto:

Passdisapprovalbill(eachitem) 50%ofbothhouses

Orloseopportunitytoundocancellationbeforeitbecomessetinstone

POLICYJUDGMENTS(notdirectlyrelevanttoconstitutionality):

Transparencydeviceputsporkoutinopen

Undoeslogrolling(dealsbetweenmembersofCongress)

MaybeagainstnondelegationprincipleCongressionallyauthorizedexecutive

reduction/expansioncannotusurpnondelegablefunctionofCongress+violates

separateofpwrs.Whateverdelegationthereisbutmustbedonesounderintelligible

principle.

HOLDING(Stevens)Formalist.Actisunconstitutional.

1. ExpressiouniusArticleI§7PresentmentClauseissilentonPres'sabilityto

enact/amend/repealstatutes,whichisanexpressprohibitiononsuchactionsbyPres

2. Violatesseparationofpowersprinciples

3. Originalism(outlierinhisargument)Historicalmaterialssurroundingenactmentof

Constitutionsaysthatpowertoenactstatutesmayonly"beexercisedinaccordwsingle,

finelywrought+exhaustivelyconsidered,procedure"

4.AlthoughPresidenthaspowertodeclinetospend,President'spowertolineitem

veto—cancelling—isdifferent.A)Allpreviousstatutesdidnot,unlikeLineItemVetoAct, givePresidentpowertounilaterallychangetextofdulyenactedstatutes.B)Noneofthose

statutesgivePresidentpowertospend$0.

SCALIA(Dissent)Functionalist.Actisconstitutional.

1. Differencebetweendecliningtospend(unquestionablyconstitutionalevenaccordingto

minority)+cancelling(unconstitutional,accordingtomajority)istechnicaldifference,

but2arefunctionallysame

functionally,powertocancelissameaspowertospend$$@President's

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discretion

2. Rather,cancellationprovisionscouldbeoffensivetodoctrineofunconstitutional

delegationoflegislativeauthority,butultimatelytheyarenot

BREYER(Dissent)Pragmatist/Functionalist.Actisconstitutional.

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