01. Introduction and Overview of Debt Agreements
Introduction
Corporate bonds and Credit Agreements involve large loans to corporations
Class is about the contractual provisions of these lending arrangements
macro perspective: general purpose
micro perspective: how clauses should be constructed, exceptions
nano perspective: is expression ambiguous, does the literal meaning conforms what we intended
Credit Agreements
typically/ mostly with banks
one bank
syndicate
types
term loan: due on a specific date
revolvers: co. can borrow and repay up to a certain amount (line of credit)
difficult to transfer your participation to another bank
letters of credit: co. handle payment for goods purchased, future obligation
credit facilities: multiple types of agreement
Corporate Bonds
Debt Securities
Often issued publicly and traded
Multiple holders of bonds of same issue
Insurance companies
Other institutional investors
Few retail investors
Indenture and Certificate
Some bonds are “private placements:” not publicly issued, less trading, usually no “indenture” but Note Purchase Agreement (or so).
Comparison
Corporate Bonds
Holdings tend to be more dispersed than Lenders in Credit Agreement
Trading is more frequent than trading/assignment in Credit Agreement
To the extent Credit Facility involves ongoing obligations of lenders (as in revolver, letter of credit), assignment is difficult.
Not doable via bonds.
Interest rate variable versus fixed
Variable: revolvers tied to market rate, LIBOR (determined by a no. of banks)
trading in corporate bonds
public placement
larger number of holders
trading frequently
trading/ assignment in credit agreement
private placement
lower no. of creditors, little or no trading
Focus of the Course
Study contractual provisions in agreements through Problem Sets
What is purpose of provisions?
How do provisions within one agreement relate to other provisions in same agreement?
Compare provisions within same type of agreement.
Compare provisions across types of agreements?
Drafting problems: mistakes, loopholes, imperfections
Case law
Parts are very detail oriented. Prior Preparation is KEY
Terminology
Bonds, Debenture, Notes
All terms for debt securities
(Even Bank Agreement will contain a “Note”)
“Bonds”
used as catch-all term
Also used more narrowly for secured obligations - What is “secured?”
Notes
Used for short-term publicly issued securities
Also used for non-public debt
Also a promise to pay, used for all kinds of debt
Debentures
Used for public debt than is longer term
Terminology and usage conventions have no legal significance
Certificated versus Uncertificated
Certificated = an actual piece of paper representing the security, the Note, Debenture, Bond, etc. Signed, often kept in a safe
Most corporate bonds in the US are certificated.
Registered versus Bearer
Registered = owner of the security is the person registered as owner by the Registrar, and not the person who possesses the piece of paper.
A register is kept, can get replacement
Bearer bonds are virtually non-existing in US for tax reasons.
Equivalent to cash, ownership transferred by that piece of paper
Sources of Legal Provisions
Indenture
For public bonds, most legal provisions are contained in the “indenture.”
contract between the Issuer/Company and a trustee
Trustee acts as representative of the bondholders (not contractual party but are third party beneficiaries of the indenture)
Bondholders are “third party beneficiaries”
Security
Some additional terms are on the Security itself.
“Form of” Security is usually part of Indenture.
Not the actually signed note, only a copy of the note before being signed
Interest Provision
In public bonds, typical pattern
Semi-annual
Interest Payment Date
Interest record date
slightly before the interest payment date, cut-off date established by a company in order to determine which shareholders are eligible to receive a dividend or distribution.
Example: Freeport Indenture
Where do you find payment and record dates?
What are the dates?
Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds
Conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders & managers
Managers serve interests of shareholders – acts to maximise company’s common stock’s value
But enhancing value of equity may reduce value of company debt, e.g.:
cash distributions to shareholders (dividend/ stock repurchases)
spin-offs to shareholders of common stock of lightly leveraged subsidiaries owning valuable corporate assets
dealings between shareholders and co. on terms favourable to shareholders
investments in projects with greater risk than originally anticipated by creditors
financing new projects with debt (and not equity)
Shareholders still want co. to take such actions if it reduce co.’s debt by more than they increase value of equity (overall value of co.)
Agency costs of debt: losses in corporate value caused by shareholders’ actions in advancing their parochial (narrow-minded) interests, while in control of a leveraged enterprise
E.g. Co. with $100 cash + $80 short-term debt Debt = $80; Stock = $20.
If co. invests all cash in a project with 50% chance of yielding $10 + 50% of yielding $150:
value of equity will increase from $20 to $35 shareholders would benefit
value of debt will decline from $80 to $45 creditors would be hurt
value of co. as a whole decline from $100 to $80
Co. should be managed to maximise the aggregate value of its debt and equity (economic efficiency) hence minimizing agency costs is important
To reduce agency costs of debt, loan agreements contain covenants to limit shareholders from running the co. in a narrow-minded way, e.g.:
Limiting the dividends, a co. may pay, amount of new debt a co. may incur
Covenants that reduce agency costs of debt are ex ante beneficial to shareholders creditors less concerned that co. will reduce value of their debt, hence willing to lend at a lower interest rate
But covenants also entail costs: costs of
monitoring compliance with covenants,
enforcing covenants
costs stemming from limitations on co’s action imposed by the covenants (as covenants often also restrict some actions that increase value of equity by more than they reduce the value of debt which increase value of the firm as a whole)
E.g. covenant restricting dividend payments to shareholders
harmful to creditor: assets of co. available to repay debt
beneficial to shareholder at the expense of creditors: from payment of dividends even if such payments reduce firm’s value
If co. doesn’t have profitable investment opportunities, distributing cash may increase co.’s value, because money retained in the co. may be invested in degreasing projects
Such covenant may either be
too lose: allowing shareholders to distribute cash even when it reduces debt value by more than it increases equity value; or
too tight: prohibiting distributions of cash even when available investment projects are not value-increasing
note re-negotiating is possible (sometimes) but costly
Having more and tighter covenants may not necessarily be preferable – should balance benefit of covenant (only strict actions that reduce firm value) and cost of a covenant (monitoring, enforcing, renegotiating, restricting actions that increase co. value)
Fabbozi & Wilson, Overview of U.S. Corporate Bonds
Debt (tax reduction for issuer) vs. equity instrument (payments seen as dividends)
Equity: corporate security gives the holder a right to share in the profit of the enterprise, while sharing in the risks
Debt: doesn’t share profit of business +...