#17087 - Causation Factual, Proximate, Intervening Actor - Criminal Law

CAUSATION

• Only required when result is an element of the crime (ex. Homicide is classic result crime)

• 3 part inquiry

  • (1) but for/actual causation

    • But for the defendant's conduct, the result would not have occurred

    • Tricky in chances of survival cases - if multiple possible causes of death (mix of drugs, D only gave one drug)

    • Can have multiple but for causes

  • (2) proximate causation

    • Defendant could foresee that his conduct would cause the result

    • 2 approaches to this

      • (1) [GOV FAVORS] defendant foresaw that his conduct causes the ultimate harm even though precise means was not foreseen [general]

        • ***defendant's conduct does not need to the sole factor in the death

        • Putting poison beside bedside: foreseeable that she would become disoriented and shocked and die from slipping on the bathroom door

        • Acosta - starting a high speed chase: foreseeable that responders would feel pressure and cause responders to crash and cause death, result is not highly extraordinary

        • Kibbe - leaving victim naked on the side of the highway: foreseeable that victim was vulnerable to a host of dangerous conditions, including that a truck would hit and kill the victim

        • Arzon - starting a fire on the 5th floor puts first responders in a vulnerable position: foreseeable that they would be killed from smoke even though there was independent source of fire that contributed to death

        • Rationale: punish according to harm

      • (2) [DEF FAVORS] defendant foresaw the specific chain of events causing the result, foresee the specific triggering cause of the result (ex. Manner/means of death, not just the result) [specific]

        • Warner-Lambert: no causation because company and officers did not know the specific means, so cannot foresee the cause of explosion in the factory

        • Rationale: punish according to subjective intent

  • Defendant argues: highly extraordinary event, out of realm of possibility, result unrelated to D's conduct

  • Consider:

    • How related is the defendant's conduct to the later events and ultimate harm

      • If completely unrelated > no proximate causation

      • Stewart : D stabbed victim, doctor performed unrelated surgery that related in V's death, conviction overruled

    • Common: take the victim as you find him

      • People v. Stamp (man has heart attack in the middle of robbery)

      • Justified because defendant's action already satisfies culpability, intent fulfilled but just not in the way expected - ex. You shoot someone, misses, but victim dies of fright

    • Negligent medical malpractice does not break causal chain

      • Assumption that it is foreseeable for there to be medical malpractice or negligence (Shabazz) BUT NOT that medical personnel would communicate diseases to patient

• (3) no intervening human actor that broke the chain of causation

  • Intervening human actor is a second actor whose voluntary action breaks the chain of causation and absolves 1st actor of liability

  • Subsequent intentional human action

    • Freely Chosen/Voluntary Acts

      • Campbell: deceased voluntarily shot himself, even though defendant verbally encouraged and hoped he would do so, the voluntary action broke the chain

      • FREE WILL if defendant is only indirectly causing the harm

    • NOT acts constrained by duress, duty, exigency/not voluntary

      • Stephenson: victim did not act voluntarily because

        • Defendant already committed the criminal acts of sexual assault and rape

        • Defendant caused physical harms (biting) altered her mental state - "mentally irresponsible"

        • Defendant kidnapped her and had dominion on her

        • SO, victim's choices was constrained, taking pills in order to kill herself is not a voluntary act

      • There is NO free will if (1) physically and mentally coerced (2) made vulnerable (3) in someone else's physical control (or feel in their control) (4) choices constrained by duty, duress, exigency

    • Insane actor will not break causal connection

    • Policy: law respects and assumes free will/autonomy

  • Subsequent reckless human action

  • When intervening actor's action is recklessly risking the result, and not intentional

    • 2 approaches

    • (1) reckless action breaks the chain of causation

      • Root (Pa.) (p.601): drag racing, deceased's decision to swerve into oncoming traffic is voluntary and assumed risk, D's recklessness must be direct cause of death - "direct causal connection" standard

      • SKILL/JUDGMENT, CHOICE

    • (2) reckless action does NOT break the chain of causation

      • McFadden (Iowa) (p.603): drag racing, victim's recklessness does not excuse defendant's reckless, victim had constrained choices and action was natural reaction> D liable because harm is foreseeable and action was reckless = ordinary proximate cause test

      • Kern: decrease's reckless decision to cross a highway was a constrained choice because he was being chased

      • LUCK/LOW JUDGMENT, CONSTRAINED CHOICE (being chased, natural reaction)

      • ***Consider level of judgment (if high/skill involved VS. low judgement/luck involved)

        • Atencio (Mass.) (p.605)- Russian Roulette, all about luck, not break causal chain. D had duty to not join

• MPC 2.03

  • But for causation (2.03(1)) + result is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability (2.03(2)(b) and 2.03(3)(b))

  • Transferred intent: if A intended to kill B but accidently kills C, can be held liable for murdering C